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ABSTRACT
Heroin has been a prohibited 
substance in Australia since the early 
1950s. Prohibition, combined with a 
continued demand for the drug, has 
spawned a profitable black market. 
This paper presents a framework for 
evaluating the net welfare effects of 
heroin consumption under 
prohibition, a task made more 
difficult because of the co-existence 
of addicts and casual users. It is 
assumed that both groups enjoy 
positive net benefits from their heroin 
consumption, but the former impose 
external costs which derive from their 
addiction. Prohibition reduces heroin 
addiction but also the surpluses of 
both groups. Furthermore, whilst 
prohibition may reduce quantity 
related social costs, it may increase 
price related social costs.
JEL classification number: D62.
"Social policy may be making the price o f heroin too high" 
(Erickson, 1969).
I INTRODUCTION
Heroin has been a prohibited substance in Australia since the 
early 1950s. That is its importation, production1, supply and 
consumption are proscribed by law and punishable by sanctions 
which include lengthy prison sentences. Of course Australia is not 
alone in its fight against heroin as similar policies exist in many 
other countries. The objective of this policy is to protect 
consumers from a commodity which is addictive and considered 
inherently dangerous. However, standard welfare theory suggests 
that all consumers enjoy positive net benefits from consumption2, 
in the form of consumer surplus3. Determining the welfare effects 
of heroin consumption is complicated because of the existence of 
casual users as well as addicts, and because of the effects of the 
prohibition.
Casual users of heroin may be defined as consumers who can 
control their use of the drug, perhaps going on an occasional 
consumption spree. In many respects they may be regarded as 
analogous to social alcohol drinkers. On the other hand addicts 
may be defined as consumers with a behavioural pattern 
characterised by an overwhelming preoccupation with the use of 
the drug and the securing of its supply. From the point of view of 
maximising social welfare, addicts are a complicating factor 
because whilst they may be benefiting personally from their 
consumption of heroin, they may also be imposing costs on 
society which derive from their addiction. Reducing the 
consumption of heroin by addicts may reduce these external costs 
but will also reduce their surplus. If the consumption of heroin by 
addicts is to be reduced by a policy of prohibition then the 
consumption, and thus surplus, of casual users will also be
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diminished. Furthermore, whilst prohibition may reduce total 
heroin consumption and so quantity related external costs, it also 
results in a higher black market price for heroin and so may 
increase price related external costs. Thus the net social cost 
effect of the prohibition is a -priori ambiguous.
This paper presents a framework for evaluating the net 
welfare effect of heroin consumption under prohibition, following 
closely but modifying the work of Pogue and Sgontz (1989) for 
alcohol. Section II presents the basic model which is then used to 
establish the equation for determining the social welfare 
optimising per unit price of heroin in Australia. Section IH 
presents estimates of the various parameters involved and the 
resultant optimal prices. Section IV discusses the sensitivity of 
the results to changes in the parameter estimates whilst criticisms 
and concluding comments are presented in section V.
II THE MODEL
Calculating the net social welfare effect arising from the 
consumption of heroin under a policy of prohibition is a difficult 
task. As a first step, suppose that the consumption of heroin is 
not prohibited and there exists two types of heroin consumer, 
addicts and casual users, who are identical in all respects except 
for their demand for heroin. In Figure 1 the demand curve for the 
typical addict is DA whilst that for the typical casual user is DN. 
Suppose also that heroin is a homogeneous product available in 
unlimited quantities at a constant per unit price equal to long run 
marginal and average cost, p.
Heroin consumption by casual users is assumed to result in no 
costs additional to the value of production and distribution. 
However, that by addicts is assumed to result in additional 
internal and external costs. The former may include increased 
morbidity and private medical expenses, emotional and physical
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pain, and lost income. The latter may take the form of injury to 
others and losses of or damage to their property, increased social 
welfare payments and reduced industrial productivity.
The demand curve Da assumes that the addict correctly 
accounts for all internal costs of excessive consumption, that is 
the effect of heroin consumption on her well-being. These costs 
are not welfare relevant. However, external costs resulting from 
property losses, social welfare payments and reduced industrial 
productivity are welfare relevant. For instance, increased social 
welfare payments, although pure income transfers, are welfare 
relevant if they result in increased rates of current or future 
taxation. Browning (1987) shows that the marginal welfare cost 
of taxes on labour earnings, whilst difficult to estimate 
accurately, are nevertheless positive. Tullio (1987) reaches a 
similar conclusion whilst King and Rebelo (1990) conclude that 
the "...influence of taxation on the rate of economic growth has 
important (negative) welfare implications" (p.s 126, brackets 
ours). If, on the other hand, the government were to fund the 
increased social welfare payments by reducing their financial 
commitments to other programs, this would cause hardship to the 
beneficiaries of these programs and so welfare losses would still 
accrue.
Losses to industrial productivity due to heroin addiction are 
also welfare relevant if wages are less than marginal productivity. 
However, even if this were not the case, where positive 
production externalities exist between employees, losses from 
chronic absenteeism on the part of the addict may be greater than 
merely the value of her marginal physical product.
The summation of these external costs are represented in 
Figure 1 by the vertical distance between the p and (p+e) 
schedules, such costs approaching zero at lower levels of 
consumption. This magnitude, shown as e in Figure 1, is the 
marginal external cost imposed on society at each level of
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consumption. Under these assumptions the typical casual user 
consumes qn per unit time whilst the typical addict consumes qa 
per unit time and imposes on society a marginal external cost 
equal to $YE per gram of heroin per unit time.
Now suppose that heroin is declared a prohibited substance 
and that, for simplicity, the cost of enforcement is negligible. 
According to Miron and Zwiebel (1991),
There are several channels through which prohibition may 
affect....consumption. First, prohibition increases supply costs, as 
these m ust include the cost of evading detection and the po ten tia l 
cost of punishm ent...Second, prohibition inhibits consumer 
access...by raising search costs, making quality dubious, and 
increasing the possibility of being cheated. Third, prohibition 
may create a prevailing sentiment that a certain commodity is 
b a d ' or 'immoral', thereby decreasing consumer demand. F inally , 
prohibition may deter some individuals' consumption because of 
'respect for the law ' (p.245).
The first of these is a supply-side price effect. In Figure 1 this 
increases the retail price of heroin by h per unit, to (p+h) per unit. 
The other three effects are on the demand-side, have been 
summed and classified a deterrent effect, and so result in a 
leftward shift of the demand curves in Figure 1 to Da* for the 
addict and D^* for the casual user.
A further impact of the prohibition is to increase marginal 
external costs. This is so because the higher, now black market 
price of heroin increases the pecuniary costs of addiction and 
may thus induce addicts to commit crimes to finance their 
addiction. Becker (1968) has shown that crime is welfare relevant 
as the estimated value of resources used up in crime is not 
identical to their net social cost because "...the cost of 'transfers' 
like burglary and embezzlement excludes social attitudes toward 
forced wealth redistribution and also the effects on capital
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accumulation of the possibility of theft" (p.174).
Furthermore, prohibition of heroin supply is likely to generate 
supply-related crimes. These could involve official corruption, 
violence among heroin suppliers struggling for market domination, 
etc. These are welfare relevant because they
"... lead to a loss of certainty and fairness in the administration of 
law, which is a real and significant cost" (Baldry 1993).
The prohibition may also result in greater losses of industrial 
productivity as addicts spend more time looking for heroin on the 
black market an d /o r committing crimes to finance their 
addiction, thus spending less time in legal productive activities. 
These effects are represented in Figure 1 by an upw ard shift of 
the marginal external cost curve to (p+e)p.
The first issue to be resolved is the net effect of the prohibition 
on the consumer surplus of casual users whose surplus prior to 
the prohibition is pAK. Under prohibition the price effect raises 
the retail price of heroin to (p+h) per unit with consumer surplus 
falling to (p+h)FK. The deterrent effect reduces surplus further to 
(p+h)DL. The price effect results in a loss of surplus equivalent to 
FAR. The deterrent effect further reduces surplus by an amount 
equivalent to FKLD. Both of these prohibition induced losses are 
welfare relevant. However, in the interests of simplicity, we 
assume that the net impact of the prohibition on casual users is to 
reduce their consumer surplus by FAR only4. An analogous 
argument can be made in the case of the heroin addict, the 
welfare relevant loss of surplus in this case being MEP only.
The second effect which needs to be considered is the impact 
on total external cost, firstly due to the decreased heroin 
consumption of addicts, and secondly due to the increased 
marginal external cost curve. Prior to the prohibition, the addict 
was in equilibrium at E, imposing a marginal external cost on 
society of $YE per gram of heroin consumed per unit time. The
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prohibition moves the addict to C, with marginal external cost 
now $IB. The prohibition has thus reduced total external cost by 
(XYEB) - Ae. The shaded area Ae represents the partial increase in 
total external cost, both consumption and supply related, due to 
the prohibition induced price increase for heroin.
The net welfare gain from prohibition, W, thus equals the net 
reduction to external cost less the reductions to the consumer 
surpluses of casual users and addicts. That is, from Figure 1:
W = (BXYE)Na - (eNA* - (MEP)NA - (FAR)Nn (1)
where NA is the number of addicts pre-prohibition, NA* is the 
number of addicts post-prohibition and N n is the number of 
casual users pre-prohibition.
Two further issues must now be considered. Firstly, to 
estimate the size of BXYE in Figure 1 the total reduction in addict 
consumption, qa-qa , must be known. The reduction due to the 
price effect alone, qa-qa', can be estimated using the percentage 
price change and the relevant elasticity. Figure 1 has been 
constructed so that the reduction due to the deterrent effect 
alone, qa'-qa*/ is exactly equal to that due to the price effect, qa- 
qa'. In general this will not be the case, rather (qa'-qa*) = n (qa-qa') 
w ith n >0S. Figure 1 depicts the special case where n=l.
The second issue concerns the relative size of Ae. In general it 
will be the case that Ae = m (BXZP) with m >0. That is, the 
partial increase in external cost due to the prohibition induced 
higher price of heroin will be some proportion m of the partial 
decrease in external cost due to the prohibition induced deterrent 
effect.





where Ej and E2 are the marginal external costs per gram of 
heroin per unit time averaged over the change in consumption from 
qa to qa' and qa' to qa* respectively, r| denotes the relevant own 
price elasticity of demand, QA=qaNA/ QN=qnNN/ and h, p,n and 
m are as previously defined.
The first order condition for maximising W with respect to h
8W /8h=Ei/p(TiAQA)+n(l-m)E2 /p(riAQA-
h/p(riAQA)-h/p(riNQN)=0 (3)
Solving (3) for h /p  gives the welfare maximising ad valorem 
price increase for heroin under a policy of prohibition:
h /p= [E i+ n(l-m )E 2) /  p] [ 1 /1 + (nNQN /  “H a Q a )  (4)
III ESTIMATING THE OPTIMAL PRICE OF HEROIN IN 
AUSTRALIA
In order to calculate (p+h) from (4) we need estimates of p, n, m, 
E l, E2, 'Hn/'Ha arid Q n /Q a- Unfortunately little reliable data
exists with regard to heroin under prohibition because of the 
clandestine nature of the market. Hence the parameter estimates 




Optimal Prices of Heroin Under Prohibition and 
Alternate Parameter Assumptions
p n m E i e 2 e ln /e la Q n /Q a H /P H+P
12 0.1 0.1 20 20 1 0.31 1.39 28.64
12 0.1 0.1 20 20 2 0.31 1.12 25.46
12 0.1 0.1 20 20 4 0.31 0.81 21.73
12 0.1 1 20 20 1 0.31 1.27 27.27
12 0.1 1 20 20 2 0.31 1.03 24.35
12 0.1 1 20 20 4 0.31 0.74 20.93
12 0.1 10 20 20 1 0.31 0.13 13.53
12 0.1 10 20 20 2 0.31 0.10 13.23
12 0.1 10 20 20 4 0.31 0.07 12.89
12 1 0.1 20 20 1 0.31 2.42 41.01
12 1 0.1 20 20 2 0.31 1.95 35.46
12 1 0.1 20 20 4 0.31 1.41 28.96
12 1 1 20 20 1 0.31 1.27 27.27
12 1 1 20 20 2 0.31 1.03 24.35
12 1 1 20 20 4 0.31 0.74 20.93
12 1 10 20 20 1 0.31 -10.18 -110.14
12 1 10 20 20 2 0.31 -8.23 -86.77
12 1 10 20 20 4 0.31 -5.95 -59.43
12 10 0.1 20 20 1 0.31 12.72 164.67
12 10 0.1 20 20 2 0.31 10.29 135.46
12 10 0.1 20 20 4 0.31 7.44 101.29
12 10 1 20 20 1 0.31 1.27 27.27
12 10 1 20 20 2 0.31 1.03 24.35
12 10 1 20 20 4 0.31 0.74 20.93
12 10 10 20 20 1 0.31 -113.23 -1,346.78
12 10 10 20 20 2 0.31 -91.56 -1,086.77
12 10 10 20 20 4 0.31 -66.22 -782.64
N ote: w hen  Ej=25 and  E2=100, h /p = 0 . This is an  un likely  case and so has been 
om itted.
To determine p, the per gram retail price of heroin, one must 
consider the type of market which is assumed to exist pre­
prohibition. Many possibilities exist. In this paper it is assumed 
that a pre-prohibition market is one where no controls exist on 
the supply of, and demand for, heroin.6 In such a market p 
represents the long run marginal and average cost of production 
in a competitive market. Because of the prohibition, direct data  
on heroin production costs in a free Australian market do not 
exist. Perhaps a reasonable estimate of p may be obtained from 
information of the 'landed' price of heroin in Sydney, most of 
which originates from East Asian countries where it is purchased 
by importers and then on-sold to domestic wholesalers.
According to Dobinson and Poletti (1988), the purchase price 
of 1 kg of 85% pure7 heroin in Bangkok was $12000-$15000, or 
$12-$15 per gram. The importer would then sell this kilogram of 
heroin 'uncut' to a wholesaler in Sydney for $200-$250 per gram. 
This massive gross return on the importation of heroin into 
Australia most likely reflects both the risk premium which is 
imposed by the importer and the preparedness of heroin 
consumers, captured by their addiction, to pay.
The purchase price in Bangkok is also most likely inflated 
because of the risks faced by the cultivators of opium and the 
manufacturers of heroin. In a free Australian heroin market, 
production would be unencumbered by such risks. Suppliers 
would be free to use the lowest cost production methods and 
transportation costs to the major population centres would be 
negligible. The efficiency gains available to domestic producers, 
over those of South East Asia, due to the availability of 
technologically advanced production methods and equipment 
would probably outweigh the losses due to higher labour costs. 
Hence we could expect that the wholesale price in a free domestic 
market would be less than $12 per gram. However, without more 
specific information, we assume that p =$12 per gram .8
9
The parameter n represents the reduction in heroin 
consumption due to the deterrent effect relative to that due to the 
price effect. In Figure 1, n = (qa'-qa*)/ (qa-qa/)=l- As mentioned 
previously this has been done for illustrative purposes only. If it 
were the case that n< l, that is that the deterrent effect is less 
than the price effect, then individuals would respond more to 
price considerations than to moral/legal ones9. The converse 
would be the case if n>l. Little reliable information exists 
regarding the strength of the deterrent effect relative to that of the 
price effect for heroin. For estimation purposes we make three 
assumptions in turn, that the deterrent effect is much w eaker/the 
same as/m uch stronger than the price effect, that is that 
n=0 .1 / n = l / n =10 respectively.
The parameter m represents the increase in external costs 
caused by the prohibition induced price increase for heroin 
relative to the decrease in external costs caused by the prohibition 
induced deterrent effect. In Figure 1 m= Ae/BXZP. Once again 
little reliable information exists regarding the magnitude of m. If it 
were the case that m >l then the increase in external costs caused 
by the prohibition induced price increase would be greater than 
the decrease in external costs caused by the deterrent effect. 
Conversely for the case of m cl. The magnitude of the heroin price 
increase caused by the prohibition probably results in a large 
increase in the number of crimes committed to finance addictions, 
w ith associated spin-offs into police corruption, etc. Hence it is 
plausible that m is greater than one. Nevertheless for estimation 
purposes we again assume in turn that m=0 .1, m =l and m=10 .
The parameters Ej and E2 represent the marginal external cost 
of heroin addiction per gram of heroin per unit time pre­
prohibition, averaged over qa to qa' and qa' to qa* respectively. A 
number of studies have attem pted to quantify the external costs 
of heroin consumption10. Unfortunately these studies relate to 
heroin consumption under prohibition and so are not particularly
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useful here. Marks (1992) notes that the typical heroin addict 
consumed approximately 98 grams of heroin in 1981. Naturally 
this would have been at a relatively high per unit price. 
Nevertheless if the demand for heroin is own price inelastic then 
we may expect that the consumption level of a typical addict 
faced with a free market price of $12 per gram might not be 
proportionately greater. This point is reinforced by the fact that 
whilst there must exist some minimum quantity of heroin which 
must be consumed by an addict per unit time to satisfy her 
addiction, there must also exist a maximum quantity compatible 
w ith continued life. If it is the case that most addicts currently 
consume quantities of heroin which are close to the minimum, and 
if the gap between the minimum and maximum is not too great 
then total heroin consumption levels may not increase 
substantially w ith a free market for heroin.
This is supported by the findings of Miron and Zwiebel (1991) 
concerning alcohol consumption in the United States during 
prohibition. They conclude that "...while alcohol consumption 
declined sharply at the onset of Prohibition, within several years 
it rebounded to 60-70 percent of its initial value and did not 
increase substantially immediately following the repeal o f Prohibition", 
(p.246, italics ours).
If this is the case then the typical heroin addict in a free heroin 
market would be faced with an annual consumption cost which 
would be quite comparable to that currently incurred by some 
alcohol or tobacco consumers. Hence it is conceivable that the 
crime component of recent estimates of the social cost of heroin 
consumption would be greatly reduced11. This leaves external 
costs associated w ith heroin overdoses12, automobile accidents, 
reduced industrial productivity and the like. In this sense then it 
is conceivable that the external costs of heroin consumption per 
addict within a free heroin market would be comparable to that 
of a typical alcohol abuser.
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Pogue and Sgontz (1989) conservatively estimate that external 
alcohol abuse costs in the United States totalled $26.1 billion in 
1983, an average of $127 per gallon of ethanol. This implies that 
approximately 205.5 million gallons of ethanol were consumed by 
alcohol abusers in 1984, who amounted to about 10% of the adult 
population. Hence in 1984 there were approximately 18 million 
alcohol abusers in the United States who each consumed 
approximately 11.4 gallons of ethanol and hence imposed, on 
average, $1450 of external costs on society. If this figure is 
applicable to the typical heroin addict in a free Australian market 
consuming approximately 100 grams per year then, after 
adjusting for inflation, Ei would be approximately $2013. Again 
for the sake of simplicity we assume that Ei=E2.
A number of researchers have attempted to estimate the own 
price elasticity of demand for heroin (see, for example, White and 
Luksetich (1983) and Silverman and Spruill (1977)). It appears 
that no generally accepted figure exists, although in a recent study 
C. van Ours (1995) finds that the long term price elasticity for 
opium use in the Dutch East Indies in 1923-38 was about -1.0. 
Similar figures have been obtained with regard to the demand for 
tobacco and heavy gambling (see Becker, Grossman and Murphy 
(1990) and Mobilia (1990) respectively). Whilst it is possible that 
addicts and casual users are equally responsive to price changes, 
it is likely that the latter are more responsive than the former. We 
thus follow the approach of Pogue and Sgontz (1989) w ith regard 
to alcohol and allow, in turn, riN/r iA to take three possible values 
in absolute terms: 1.0, 2.0 and 4.0.
Marks (1992) suggests that addicts consumed 2940kgs of 
heroin whilst casual users consumed 900kgs of heroin (p.539). 
Whilst these estimates were made with a prohibition in force, we 
assume that the proportional consumption of casual users to 
addicts would be unchanged without prohibition. We thus 
assume that Qn /Q a = 0.31.
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These parameter estimates, and the subsequent calculations 
presented in Table 1, must be treated with considerable caution 
because of the many uncertainties and simplifications which the 
preceding brief discussion has highlighted. Nevertheless, the 
resultant values of h /p  and h+p are presented in Table 1 where 
the column heading for r|N/r|A is eln/ela.
The results of Table 1 suggest that the optimal per unit price 
for heroin tinder prohibition lies in the range $165 to $-1347, 
depending on the assumed values for the various parameters in 
equation (4). The lower bound of this range in particular requires 
explanation. Also, it is im portant to ascertain the magnitude and 
direction of the effects of variations in the parameter estimates on 
the optimal price for heroin.
Firstly, 8 (h /p )/8 (r |N/r)A)<0, that is the more responsive to 
heroin price changes are casual users than addicts, the lower the 
optimal price. This is so because the greater the relative response 
of casual users to heroin price increases, the greater the net loss of 
consumer surplus and thus welfare because of prohibition 
induced heroin price increases. Thus the greater this ratio, ceteris 
paribus, the lower the optimal price.
Secondly, the greater the relative size of the price induced 
increase in the external cost curve, m, the lower the optimal price, 
ceteris paribus. This is so because a higher value for m implies that 
price induced external costs of addiction, in the form of official 
corruption and violence, etc., are higher for any given price 
increase following the imposition of prohibition. Thus the optimal 
price is lower.
Thirdly, the greater the relative size of the deterrent effect, n, 
the greater the optimal price, ceteris paribus. This is so in this 
model because the deterrent effect is assumed to have no 
consumer surplus implications. That is, consumer surplus losses 
because of inwards shifts of the demand curves following 
prohibition have, for the sake of simplicity, been ignored. Thus in
13
this model the deterrent effect is welfare enhancing because it 
results in less consumption by addicts and hence less external 
costs.
Finally, negative optimal prices, indicating that heroin 
consumers should be subsidised, appear in the case of a very 
large price induced shift in the external cost curve, that is when 
m=10. This result should not be taken literally. Rather, it suggests 
that, in the case where the propensity of addicts to commit 
crimes to finance their addiction per unit heroin price increase is 
large, and where much official corruption, etc., is likely to occur 
per unit heroin price increase, heroin prices ought to be kept as 
low as possible.
V  POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In an attem pt to arrive at a policy relevant conclusion, we make 
some educated, perhaps conservative assumptions. Suppose that 
the vast majority of people respect and support official policy 
regarding heroin, so that the deterrent effect is very strong (n=10). 
Suppose also that our law enforcement officials are also largely 
incorruptible and that crimes committed by addicts are minor in 
consequence (m=0.1). Finally, suppose that casual users are very 
much more responsive to heroin price changes that are addicts 
( t In / t 1a = 4 ) .  In this hypothetical situation the above analysis 
suggests that the optimal price of heroin under prohibition in 
Australia would be approximately $101 per gram. Recent black 
market prices, whilst fluctuating significantly, seem to have 
averaged approximately twice this figure. If this is the case then 
the analysis presented in this paper suggests that the current 
prohibition is being enforced too stringently, is creating an 
excessive price for heroin, and so is resulting in net social welfare 
losses14.
The approach taken in this paper to analyse the social welfare
14
effects of heroin consumption is necessarily simplistic and so 
many limitations exist. As already mentioned many of the 
parameter values used in the calculations of Table 1 are educated 
guesses at best and ad-hoc at worst. If actual parameter values 
are significantly different to those used in Table 1 then our 
conclusions will need to be modified accordingly.
Also, the analysis assumes that addicts receive positive net 
benefits from their heroin consumption in the form of consumer 
surplus. It is equally plausible, however, to regard heroin 
addiction as a disease. In this case the welfare of addicts would 
be increased by reducing their consumption and so the optimal 
price would be higher, ceteris paribus, than indicated in Table 1.
Another criticism concerns the notion of consumer surplus. If 
it is reasonable to argue that demand reductions due to an official 
policy of prohibition are welfare relevant then losses of consumer 
surplus are greater than suggested in the above analysis and 
hence optimal prices would be lower, ceteris paribus.
Perhaps the most important criticism is that our model is 
static and short run in nature. It thus takes no account of the 
dynamics of addiction formation and cessation as does the 
model of Becker and M urphy (1988) for instance.
Despite these and other limitations we have attem pted to 
analyse the social welfare implications of heroin consumption 
under prohibition and conclude, tentatively, that the current 

































1 Medical authorities are permitted to manufacture or import small quantities 
of heroin for research purposes only.
2 Another view is that heroin addicts are diseased and thus enjoy no consumer 
surplus. In this case reducing their heroin consumption would increase their 
welfare.
3 Willig (1976) has shown that under certain conditions consumer surplus is a 
reasonable approximation of consumer welfare.
4 This simplification will result in overestimates of the welfare maximising 
price of heroin.
5 It may in fact be the case that by declaring heroin a prohibited substance the 
authorities actually make its consumption a more attractive activity for 
addicts who may, on the whole, be risk loving. In this case n<0.
6 Other than the usual regulations protecting the interests of minors, etc. Other 
non-prohibition possibilities exist, such as a regulated market where heroin 
could be legally supplied only by physicians and legally consumed only by 
their patients. This sort of market for heroin existed in the UK during the 
1950s.
7 This purity figure is from Elliot (1982), p. 16.
8 We ignore the issue of current pricing as no appropriate heroin price deflator 
exists. In any case, given the size of the gross returns to heroin as it travels 
down the distribution chain, concerns on the part of heroin dealers regarding 
the erosion of purchasing power due to the general rate of inflation are likely 
to be minimal.
9 See Cameron (1988) for a discussion of why the deterrent effect may be 
weaker than commonly thought.
10 For instance, see Marks (1992).
11 There is some uncertainty regarding the direction of causality between heroin 
addiction and crime. That is, whilst the common perception is that addicts 
commit crimes to finance their addiction, many were criminals prior to their 
addiction. Nevertheless it seems reasonable to assume that a significantly 
lower price for heroin would be associated with less crime, given that heroin 
is generally considered not to be criminogenic.
12 Most current cases of addicts dying from heroin overdoses seem to be caused 
by uncertain heroin purity and/or quality. Presumably, in a free and open 
market, this would be less of a problem.
13 We ignore exchange rate effects.
14 This conclusion is reinforced if prohibition enforcement costs are positive 
and included in the calculus.
17
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